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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--GENDER EQUALITY AND SINGLE-SEX
EDUCATION. UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is currently
the most important concept in the Constitution for the protection of an
individual's rights. Recently, the Supreme Court again defined new boundaries
as to when and how the Equal Protection Clause will apply to gender. In
United States v. Virginia (VMI),' the United States Supreme Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause required the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) to admit
women into its program.2 The Court noted that Virginia failed to show an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for the disparate treatment of women
The implications of the VMI decision are far-reaching for both future gender
classifications and higher educational institutions.
This note examines the history of the Equal Protection Clause as it applies
to gender classifications. It thoroughly discusses the facts of VMI and then
analyzes the rationales underlying the precedent leading up to the VMI case.
After examining the reasoning of the Court, this note addresses the significance
of the VMI holding.
HI. FACTS
Virginia Military Institute was founded in 1839 as an all-male, state-
supported, military college.4 From its inception, VMI remained a male-only
institute with the primary goal of producing citizen-soldiers, young men
competent as honorable leaders in both civilian and military life.5 To obtain
this goal, VMI uses a unique system known as the adversative method which
is distinguished by extreme stress, complete absence of privacy, continuous
regulation, and equality of treatment.6  VMI is currently the only school of
1. 116S.Ct.2264(1996).
2. See id. at 2287.
3. See id. at 2276.
4. See id. at 2269. Virginia Military Institute is located in Lexington, Virginia and enrolls
approximately 1300 young men. See Brief for the Petitioner at 2, United States v. Virginia, 116
S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-1941).
5. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2269. VMI's mission is "to produce educated and honorable
men, prepared for the varied work of civil life, imbued with love of learning, confident in the
functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of public service, advocates of the
American democracy and free enterprise system, and ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their
country in time of national peril." Id. at 2270 (quoting Mission Study Committee of the VMI
Board of Visitors Report, May 16, 1986).
6. See id. at 2269. The adversative method consists of six parts: the rat line, the class
system, the dyke system, the honor code, barracks life, and the military system. See Petitioner's
Brief at 4, VM1 (No. 94-1941). One of the most important parts of the adversative system is
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higher education in the United States utilizing the adversative method.7 This
rigid method pushes the young men to their individual limits in an effort to
discover unknown capabilities In addition to employing the adversative
system, VMI offers a rigorous curriculum with degrees in sciences, engineer-
ing, and liberal arts. 9
Although VMI's admission policy remained untouched for nearly a
century and a half, in 1990 an anonymous female seeking admission to VMI
filed a complaint with the Attorney General of the United States.'0 In response,
the United States sued Virginia and VMI claiming violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' The United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia 2 relied on precedent established in
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,3 and applied an intermediate
scrutiny test to review the equal protection violation claim. 4 Finding that
diversity in education was an important governmental interest and that single-
sex colleges contributed to diversity, the court held that Virginia met the
what is known as the rat line. See id. at 3-4. As a part of the rat line, first year cadets are
subjected to quick punishment, torment, harsh physical exercises, and continuous regulation.
See id. at 4. The primary outcome of the rat line is to bond the cadet with his peers. See id.
The second part of the adversative system is the class system where each class is assigned
certain duties and privileges. See id. The class system is designed to teach leadership and
discipline. See id. The third segment is the dyke system where each first year cadet is assigned
an upper classman as a mentor. See id. This mentor program relieves some of the stress a rat
endures and creates a bond between classes. See id. Fourth is the honor code which states that
a cadet "does not lie, cheat, steal nor tolerate those who do." Id. This code is strictly enforced
with a single penalty resulting in expulsion. See id. The fifth part is the barracks life which is
primarily characterized by the absence of privacy and is designed to create a stressful
environment and to produce equality between cadets. See id. at 4-5. The last distinguishing
part of the adversative method is the military system. See id. at 4. Cadets are required to
participate in ROTC and wear uniforms. See id. See also United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d
890, 893 (4th Cir. 1992).
7. See Petitioner's Brief at 3, VMI(No. 94-1941). At one time the United States military
academies used the adversative method but have long since abandoned the method. See id.
8. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2270.
9. See id.
10. Seeid.at 2271.
11. See id. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no State
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
12. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1410-11 (W.D. Va. 1991).
13. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that a defendant claiming that a classification based on
gender is not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause must show an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for the classification based on gender). This exceedingly persuasive justification
is shown when the defendant proves that the classification serves an important governmental
objective and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the objectives.
See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2271.
14. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2271.
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intermediate scrutiny test; therefore, the exclusion of women from VMI was
justified.15
The United States appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit,' 6 and argued that providing men with a unique educational
opportunity as one component of educational diversity was not an important
state objective. 17 The court of appeals rejected the argument and agreed with
the district court that diversity in education was a legitimate state interest and
that the exclusion of women from VMI was a legitimate means to achieve that
objective."8 The court also held, however, that although Virginia provided
diversity in education to young men, the state had not provided the same
opportunity to young women and failed to reasonably justify the male
favoritism.19 Thus, the court of appeals specifically refused to order VMI to
admit women but remanded the case to district court in order for Virginia to
devise a plan that would provide women an opportunity for diverse education
consistent with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.2°
To comply with the Fourth Circuit's decision, Virginia organized a task
force consisting of experts in women's education.2' The task force developed,
and the state approved, a plan for an all-female program known as the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL). 2 VWIL is a state-funded program
conducted at Mary Baldwin College, a private liberal arts college in Virginia.23
Like VMI, VWIL's mission is to produce citizen-soldiers competent as leaders
in both civilian life and the military; however, VWIL's method of education
is extremely different.' 4 Although VWIL is a public education program with
military training designed exclusively for women, 25 VWIL uses a cooperative
method that supports self-esteem and self-confidence rather than the adversa-
15. See id.
16. See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
17. See id. at 892.
18. See id. at 896.
19. See id. at 899. The Commonwealth of Virginia maintains fifteen public colleges of
which only VMI is single-sex. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1418 (W.D.
Va. 1991). Therefore, the Commonwealth of Virginia provides no publicly funded all-female
colleges or universities. However, there are five private women-only colleges and one private
all-male college. See id. at 1420.
20. See Virginia, 976 F.2d. at 900.
21. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2272.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. VWIL's mission is to produce "citizen-soldiers who are educated and
honorable women, prepared for the varied work of civil life, qualified to serve in the armed
forces, imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, and
possessing a high sense of public service." United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 494
(W.D. Va. 1994).
25. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2272.
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tive method.26 Women at VWIL are not required to eat together, live in
barracks, or wear uniforms, and the training does not induce the physical or
mental stress created by the training at VMI.
27
The district court approved the plan, noting that the programs at VMI and
VWIL were substantially different but that the Constitution does not require
identical programs for men and women to meet the mandates of the Fourteenth
Amendment.28 In response, the United States again appealed to the Fourth
Circuit, 29 contending that VWIL did not meet the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause and that women were still denied the opportunity to
participate in a unique state-supported educational program.30 The United
States further argued that any program designed to remedy the violation would
have to be identical to the program at VMI l.3  The Fourth Circuit rejected the
United States's argument. a2 Relying in part on Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, the court designed a revised intermediate scrutiny test called
"substantive comparability. 3 3 Under this test, in addition to showing that the
classification based on gender was substantially related to an important
governmental interest, VMI must also show that VMI men and VWIL women
gained "substantially comparable benefits. 34 Upon review, the Circuit Court
concluded that although there were differences in intangible benefits, the
programs were substantially comparable because both men and women would
be offered an education program that stressed leadership and discipline. 5 The
United States promptly appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 6 The
Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg, held that Virginia had not
shown an exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding women from VMI
and that the creation of VWIL did not remedy the constitutional violation.37
26. See id. at 2273. The task force "determined that a military model and, especially
VMI's adversative method, would be wholly inappropriate for educating and training most
women for leadership roles." See Petitioner's Brief at 9, VMI (No. 94-1941).
27. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2282-83.
28. See id. at 2273.
29. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995).
30. See id. at 1235.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 1235-36.
34. See id. at 1236.
35. See Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1241. The court recognized that the benefits of reputation and
prestige were absent from VWIL, but that these intangible benefits must be developed over a
period of time and are impossible to remedy at this time. See id.
36. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. 2264.




The foundation for VMI was laid at the start of American history. From
the country's inception, women were denied access to education. 8 Though no
one realized the significance of the event, women achieved a major victory
with the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 Although years would pass
before the full breadth of the Amendment was realized, the Fourteenth
Amendment eventually brought gender discrimination to its knees. Most
recently the Fourteenth Amendment delivered another strike against gender
discrimination in VMI. To adequately develop the Court's reasoning in VMI,
this background section briefly explores the history of discrimination against
women, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and finally the development
of gender equality and the law through the Privileges and Immunities Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause.
A. The History of Discrimination Against Women in America
Although women today have achieved equal recognition in almost all
areas of society and the law, originally women rarely possessed any legal
rights.4° For example, women had no right to enter into contracts or to convey
property, and women could not be responsible for any criminal acts done at a
husband's direction.4
Education, in particular, was one area of society where women suffered
from discrimination and exclusion. In colonial America, women were merely
trained for domestic work.42 Women were to possess modest and delicate
characteristics, and any type of education quickly disposed of such desirable
traits.43
Although progress was slow, women gradually became visible in the
educational arena, and finally in 1833 Oberlin College opened its doors to
women, becoming the first co-ed college." Later, in 1861, Vassar College
founded the first women's college.45 As astounding as this progress was,
38. See PATRICIA SEXTON, WOMEN IN EDUCATION 41 (1976).
39. See 1 MARLENE S. WORTMAN, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW: FROM COLONIAL TIMES
TO THE NEW DEAL 7-9 (1985).
40. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.20, at 733
(4th ed. 199 1).
41. Seeid. atn.1.
42. See SEXTON, supra note 38, at 41.
43. See ELIZABETH SEYMOUR ESCHBACH, THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF WOMEN IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 1865-1920, at 8 (1993).
44. See SEXTON, supra note 38, at 47.
45. See SEXTON, supra note 38, at 47.
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women were still far from equal.' For example, Oberlin did not allow women
to take the same courses as their male peers and frequently required them to
wash the male students' laundry, serve the men at meals, and clean the men's
rooms.
4 7
Just as women gained some progress in higher education, Dr. Edward
Clarke, a prominent physician, wrote Sex in Education and warned of the
devastating effects learning may have on young women's bodies. 48 Because
Dr. Clarke delivered his attack by describing women's physiological unfitness
for the strenuous college curriculum, Dr. Clarke's book had a lasting effect on
American women and established women's lack of stamina as a convenient
rationale for denying them access to education.49
B. Early Attempts at Gender Equality Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Prior to passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, state sovereignty was the
prevalent theory concerning the relationship between the federal and state
governments.50 States freely regulated and restricted the rights of their
citizens."1 In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment passed.12 Since the primary
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment focused on the issue of race, the courts
initially interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to apply exclusively to the
treatment of African-Americans.53 The Court applied the Equal Protection
clause narrowly, trying to advance the rights of African-Americans while
avoiding taking power away from states.
54
46. See SEXTON, supra note 38, at 47.
47. See SEXTON, supra note 38, at 47. Until 1841, women at Oberlin could only enroll
in a "literary" course and were not allowed to study law, theology, or medicine. See EVA CARY
& KATHLEEN W. PERATIS, WOMAN AND THE LAW 5 (1979).
48. See LIVA BAKER, I'M RADCLIFFE! FLY ME!: THE SEVEN SISTERS AND THE FAILURE OF
WOMEN'S EDUCATION 65 (1976). For example, Dr. Clarke warned that "[t]here have been
instances of females ... [who have] graduated from school or college excellent scholars, but
with undeveloped ovaries. Later they married, and were sterile." Id. at 68.
49. See id. at 67-68, 70.
50. See WORTMAN, supra note 39, at 7.
51. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Court could not
intervene if the states chose to deny to any class of persons the liberties enumerated in the Bill
of Rights).
52. See Louis A. WARSOFF, EQUALITY AND THE LAW 142 (1975).
53. See id. at 136. Warsoff maintains that although the primary purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was racial, additional purposes included punishment for the South, preservation
of the Republican Party, and establishment of congressional authority over the states and against
the President. See id. at 149.
54. See id. at 199. See also Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) (stating that
"neither the [Fourteenth] amendment---broad and comprehensive as it is-nor any other
amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the State .... ).
[Vol. 20
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Although the main purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect
the basic rights of African-Americans, courts found the Amendment easy to
expand in applying it to other situations." This ease in application was based
on the idea that the country was founded on a concept of equality.56
As the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment expanded and state
legislatures were not permitted to limit individual rights arbitrarily, women
began to challenge state laws under the Amendment.57 These early challenges
to gender classifications were not brought under the Equal Protection Clause. 58
In Bradwell v. Illinois, Mrs. Myra Bradwell challenged Illinois's refusal to
grant her an attorney's license based on her gender.5 The Court, holding that
the denial of the license to practice law was constitutional, decided the issue
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.6° The Court found that admission
to the bar was not a right of United States citizenship.6' Thus, Illinois
possessed the power to deny her admission to the bar.62 Although Mrs.
Bradwell failed in her quest to practice law, this case laid the foundation for
later challenges to gender-based classifications.
Not only did the Court find that the Fourteenth Amendment failed to
protect a woman's right to enter the legal profession; the Court also found that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not give women the right to vote.63 In Minor
v. Happersett, the Supreme Court held that provisions in state constitutions
which granted the right to vote only to male citizens of the United States did
not violate the Constitution.64 Although the Court found that women were
citizens, it concluded that voting was not a right of all citizens.65
55. See WARSOFF, supra note 52, at 163.
56. See WARSOFF, supra note 52, at 163-64. See also Holden v. James, I 1 Mass. 396
(1814) (stating that "manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice,
and the spirit of our constitution and laws, [is] that any one citizen should enjoy privileges, and
advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances").
57. See WORTMAN, supra note 39, at 7.
58. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
59. See id. Illinois refused to issue Mrs. Bradwell a license to practice law on the basis
that "as a married woman [she] would be bound neither by her express contracts nor by those
implied contracts which it is the policy of the law to create between attorney and client." Id.
at 131. In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the fact "that God designed the sexes
to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute
the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth." Id. at 132.
60. See id. at 138-39. The Privileges and Immunities Clause states that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States .... " U.S. Const. amend XIV.
61. See id. at 139.
62. See id.
63. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
64. See id.
65. See id. Women would have to wait until 1920 and the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment for the right to vote. See WORTMAN, supra note 39, at 294.
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
C. The Equal Protection Clause
Over time, the Privileges and Immunities Clause declined and the Equal
Protection Clause established itself as the dominant force in the Fourteenth
Amendment. 66 As the Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to gender
classifications, it showed great deference to the legislature, illustrated in
Goesaert v. Cleary.67 In Goesaert, Michigan passed a statute forbidding a
female from working as a bartender unless she was the wife or daughter of the
male bar owner.68 Ms. Valentine Goesaert, who was the owner of a bar, her
daughter Margaret, and two other female employees brought suit to maintain
their livelihood.69 Ms. Goesaert argued that classifying wives and daughters
of bar owners separately from wives and daughters of non-bar owners was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.70 Holding that the classification was
"not without a basis in reason" and that "Michigan could, beyond question"
prohibit women from tending a bar, the Court quickly settled the question.7
Although Ms. Valentine lost, the Court used a rational basis test, which was
significant in that the Court denied any special treatment or heightened scrutiny
to classifications based on gender.72
66. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL.
L. REV. 341, 342 (1949) (explaining the significance of the Court's holding).
67. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
68. See id. at 464-65 (citing MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.990(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1947)).
69. See JUDITH A. BAER, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW: THE STRUGGLE TOWARD EQUALITY
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE PRESENT 27 (1991).
70. See Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 465.
71. See id. at 465-66. The Court's tone toward the case can be noted in Justice
Frankfurter's statement, "[b]eguiling as the subject is, it need not detain us long." Id. at 465.
72. See id. Currently, equal protection issues are analyzed under one of three levels of
scrutiny. First, the rational basis standard of scrutiny asks only whether the classification bears
a rational relationship to a constitutionally permitted governmental goal. See NOWAK, supra
note 40, § 14.3, at 574-75. As long as the legislature had a basis for creating the classification,
the law will not be invalidated. See NOWAK, supra note 40, § 14.3, at 575. The second level
of review is the strict scrutiny standard. See NOWAK, supra note 40, § 14.3, at 575. Under this
standard, the Court determines whether the relationship between the classification and the
governmental interest is sufficiently compelling, rather than deferring to the decision of the
legislature. See NOWAK, supra note 40, § 14.3, at 575. This level of scrutiny applies to
classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage. See NOWAK, supra note 40, § 14.3,
at 576. The final level of review is the intermediate level which first appeared in Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971). See infra note 73. This standard shows less deference to legislatures than
the rational basis level but is not as stringent as the strict scrutiny standard. See NOWAK, supra
note 40, § 14.3, at 576. As dictated in Craig v. Boren, the classification must be substantially
related to an important governmental interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
This level is applied to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy. See NOWAK, supra
note 40, § 14.3, at 576.
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For the next twenty-three years,the Court analyzed gender classifications
under the rational basis standard until the landmark decision in Reed v. Reed.73
Reed marked the emergence of a new path in the Court's analysis of gender
classifications.74 In Reed, Cecil and Sally Reed, the adoptive parents of a,
deceased minor, both sought appointment as administrator of the minor's
estate.75 The probate court appointed the father as administrator based on a
Idaho statute that gave preference to men as administrators over women.76
Sally Reed brought an action claiming that the preference was a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause." In an unanimous decision, the Court agreed with
Ms. Reed and held that the gender classification did not bear a rational
relationship to the state's objective.7" Although the Court did not dictate a new
standard, it quietly adopted what became the intermediate standard of review.79
Had the Court used the traditional rational basis standard, it probably would
have found that the classification was sufficiently related to the legitimate
objective of the state.8"
Although the decision in Reed was unanimous, cases after Reed indicate
that the Court was not in agreement as to the precise level of scrutiny to be
afforded gender classifications. In Frontiero v. Richardson,8 the plurality
opinion of a sharply divided Court held that gender was a suspect class and
therefore deserved strict scrutiny treatment.8 2 In Frontiero, a military service
73. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an amicus brief for the ACLU in
Reed and argued it before the Supreme Court claiming that gender was a suspect class and
should receive strict scrutiny treatment. See Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One
Woman's Work to Change the Law, 14 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 335, 337 (1992).
74. See Michael J. Corbera, The Women 's Convention and the Equal Protection Clause,
26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 755, 763-64 (1995).
75. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 72.
76. See id. at 73. The statute stated that "[o]f several persons claiming and equally entitled
[under § 15-312] to administer, males must be preferred to females, and relatives of the whole
to those of the half blood." Id. (citing IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (1948)).
77. See id.
78. See id. at 76. The Court found that Idaho's "objective of reducing the workload on
probate courts" had some legitimacy, but it did not rise to a level that could survive equal
protection scrutiny. See id.
79. See id. (citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (stating that
a classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation" to the objective)). See Corbera, supra note 74,
at 764-65.
80. See NOWAK, supra note 40, § 14.22, at 740.
81. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
82. See id. at 688 (plurality). Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion joined by Justice
Douglas, Justice White, and Justice Marshall. See id. at 678 (plurality). Justice Powell wrote
an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
joined (stating that Reed supports the decision and it is unnecessary and premature to add sex
as a suspect class). See id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stewart filed a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment ( [T]he statutes before us work an invidious discrimination
1997]
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woman challenged a federal statute that allowed servicemen to claim their
wives as dependents and receive related benefits without having to provide
proof of actual dependency.8 3 Servicewomen could not claim their husbands
as dependents without first proving that the husband was, in fact, a dependent.'
Writing the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan found that gender was a suspect
class, and thus easily rejected the state's argument that administrative
convenience was a sufficient ground for the disparate treatment.85 Justice
Brennan found support for the strict scrutiny standard in Reed.
86
Although Justice Brennan managed to gather support for the strict scrutiny
analysis in a plurality decision, Justice Powell's concurrence would prevail and
establish the intermediate scrutiny standard for gender classifications in Craig
v. Boren. 7 In Justice Powell's opinion, not only did Reed not declare gender
to be a suspect class, but the adoption of strict scrutiny was inessential to a
decision favorable to servicewomen.8
Although Frontiero pushed gender classification to the strict scrutiny
level, it would not remain there. Three years later, the case that expressly
established the modem intermediate scrutiny test was decided in Craig v.
Boren.89 Craig involved an Oklahoma statute that permitted females eighteen
years old or older to purchase 3.2% beer but prohibited the sale of the beer to
males until they reached twenty-one years of age.90 The Court applied a two-
in violation of Constitution.). See id. (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist wrote a
dissenting opinion (based on the reasoning in Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (1972)). See
id (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 678-79 (plurality). Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the amicus brief for the
ACLU in Frontiero and argued it before the Supreme Court, claiming that gender was a suspect
class and therefore required strict scrutiny treatment. See Markowitz, supra note 73, at 344.
See also Michael J. Confusione, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Thurgood Marshall:
A Misleading Comparison, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 887, 889-90 (1995).
84. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678-79. (plurality).
85. See id. at 688-89. (plurality).
86. See id. (plurality). Justice Brennan reasoned that our nation had a "long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination;" that gender was a "highly visible" and immutable
characteristic; that gender frequently has no relation to the ability to perform; and finally, that
Congress had shown an increasing sensitivity to gender-based classifications. See id. at 684-87.
(plurality).
87. 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976).
88. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). At the time Frontiero was
decided, the Equal Rights Amendment had been approved by Congress and sent to the states
for ratification. See id. (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell argued that the adoption of the
Equal Rights Amendment would solve gender classification by use of the legislative process
rather than the judicial process. See id. (Powell, J., concurring). In his view, if the Court
expanded Reed to adopt gender as a suspect class, the judiciary would invade the legislative
branch and the voice of the people. See id. (Powell, J., concurring).
89. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Again, Ruth Bader Ginsberg wrote the amicus brief for the
ACLU in Craig and argued it before the Supreme Court. See Markowitz, supra note 73, at 355.
90. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92. Section 241 of the statute provided that "[i]t shall be
[Vol. 20
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
part test in striking down the statute and for the first time articulated the
intermediate scrutiny standard.9' The test established by the Court dictated that
first, a state must show an important governmental interest, and second, the
classification based on gender must be substantially related to the achievement
of the objective. 92 The Court found support for this intermediate standard in
Reed.93
Not only did Craig establish the intermediate scrutiny standard, but the
case also firmly established that "archaic and over broad" generalizations 94
could not justify use of a gender classification.95 Likewise, the Court stated
that "outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home
rather than in the 'marketplace and world of ideas"' were incapable of
legitimizing state statutes.
96
Finally, Craig is important because the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause through its discrimination against men. 97 This clearly shows
that the Court meant to apply the intermediate standard in all gender classifica-
tions regardless of which gender is disadvantaged.
98
After Craig, the middle level of review was generally accepted as
applying to gender classifications. 99 However, because each case the Court
decided was based on a fact-intensive analysis, the Court continued to struggle
to apply the new standard.' ° In Michael M. v. Superior Court,'°' the Supreme
Court decided whether a California statutory rape law violated the Equal
Protection Clause."0 2 Michael M., a seventeen-year-old male, was charged with
having sex with a sixteen-year-old female in violation of the statutory rape
law. 0 3 The Court again rejected a strict scrutiny analysis and applied the
unlawful for any person who holds a license to sell and dispense beer.., to sell, barter or give
to any minor any beverage containing more than one-half of one per cent of alcohol measured
by volume and not more than three and two-tenths (3.2) per cent of alcohol measure by weight."
Id. at 191-92 n.I (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 241 (1958 & Supp. 1976)). Section 245 defined
a minor as "a female under the age of eighteen (18) years, and a male under the age of twenty-
one (21) years." Id. at 191-92 n.l. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 245 (1958 & Supp. 1976)).
91. See id. at 197-98.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 197-98.
95. See id. at 198 (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
96. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99 (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975)).
97. See id. See also Corbera, supra note 74, at 769.
98. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99.
99. See NOWAK, supra note 40, §§ 14.22-.23, at 742-43.
100. See Corbera, supra note 74, at 769.
101. 450U.S. 464(1981).
102. See id. at 466.
103. See id. The statute made men criminally liable for having sexual intercourse with "a
female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." Id.
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intermediate level of review."'4 The Court found that protecting young women
from illegitimate pregnancies was a legitimate legislative goal, and that the
disparate treatment by the statute served as a valid means of achieving that
goal. 10 5 Significantly, the Court showed the flexibility of the intermediate
standard by upholding the constitutionality of a criminal statute that provided
for different treatment on the basis of gender.'06
Finally, in 1982 the Court decided a case that provided the ammunition
the Court would need for VMI. In Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan,10 7 a state supported nursing school denied admission to Joe Hogan
based on an all-female admissions policy.' Hogan brought suit against the
University claiming that the admissions policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause.'0 9 In response, Mississippi claimed that the admissions policy
furthered the important governmental interest of compensating women for past
discrimination." 0 Justice O'Connor, writing for a five-to-four majority, applied
an intermediate scrutiny analysis and found the admissions policy unconstitu-
tional."' First, the Court rejected the argument that compensating women for
past discrimination was an important governmental interest in this instance."2
Although the Court agreed that in some instances compensation for past
discrimination was an important governmental goal, in this case, admitting only
women to the nursing program "reinforce[d] the stereotype that nursing is a
woman's job."'" 3 Next, the Court found that the gender-based classification
was not directly related to Mississippi's stated compensatory objective.'
Not only did the Court strike down the all-female admissions policy; it
also opened the door for heightened scrutiny by implying a potential elevation
(citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981)).
104. See id. at 468-69. "IT]he traditional minimum rationality test takes on a somewhat
'sharper focus' when gender-based classifications are challenged." Id.
105. See id. at 470.
106. See Corbera, supra note 74, at 774 (emphasis added).
107. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
108. See id. at 720-21.
109. See id. at 721.
110. Seeid. at 727.
111. See id. at 730.
112. See id. at 727-28 (emphasis added).
113. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-30. The Court rejected the use of generalizations and
stereotypes by stating that
[t]he purpose of requiring [a] close relationship [between the important
governmental interest and the means of achieving that interest] is to assure that the
validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than
through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions





of the intermediate standard emphasizing that the justification for the gender
based classification must be "exceedingly persuasive."'' 5 The holding in
Hogan was limited, as the Court did not determine if publicly funded single-
sex educational institutions were intrinsically unconstitutional. However, the
Court hinted that single-sex education is constitutional if an extremely
persuasive justification can be shown. 116
By 1991, when the United States brought the action against Virginia and
VMI, the prior decisions of the Court provided a foundation upon which VMI
could be decided. The intermediate standard was securely established, and the
combination of the traditional intermediate standard and the new language of
"exceedingly persuasive" was rooted in that foundation.' 7
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In United States v. Virginia,"8 the United States Supreme Court held that
Virginia did not show an exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding
women from the unique educational program offered at Virginia Military
Institute.') In addition, Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership, the all-
women's program implemented to remedy the equal protection violation, did
not pass constitutional muster because it did not afford both genders compara-
ble benefits. 1
20
United States v. Virginia presented two issues to the Court: first, whether
excluding women from VMI and its unique educational method violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and second, if so, what
is the constitutional remedy for the violation.'12 The Court addressed the first
issue by relying on the intermediate scrutiny test established in Mississippi
115. See id. at 724 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) and Personnel Adm'r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)).
116. See Jeremy N. Jungreis, Holding the Line at VMI and the Citadel: The Preservation
of a State 's Right to Offer a Single-gender Military Education, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 795, 811
(1996) (discussing the Court's holding in Hogan).
117. The phrase "exceedingly persuasive" was used in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461
(1981); and Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
118. 116S.Ct.2264(1996).
119. See id. at 2269. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in which five of the
justices joined. See id. Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, see id.
at 2287 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), while Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion. See id.
at 2291. Justice Thomas, whose son attends VMI, did not take part in the decision. See id. at
2269. See Paul Barrett, High Court to Hear Discrimination Case Over VMI's Policy of
Excluding Women, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1995, at B5.




University for Women v. Hogan2 2 and in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel TB.
123
Under this test, a state that defends a classification based on gender must
present an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification. 124 In
order to do so, the state must show that the classification is substantially
related to an important governmental interest.1 25 Moreover, the justification
cannot be in response to litigation, nor can it be based on traditional stereotypes
or generalities.2 6 Rather, the justification must be sincere and valid. 27
Virginia initially attempted to provide persuasive justification for the
exclusion of women by arguing that the all-male program supplied essential
diversity in education which is a substantial benefit to its citizens.128 Although
the Court agreed that diversity in public education was an important
governmental interest, it rejected the argument that diversity was the actual
purpose for establishing the all-male policy at VMI.129 Relying on Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, the Court distinguished between the actual
reason for the exclusion of women and the asserted rationalization. 3 0 Based
on the history of public education and the institution, the Court concluded that
diversity was not the primary objective of the exclusionary policy.'3' The
Court noted that traditionally public education has excluded women from
opportunities based on gross misconceptions of women's abilities, their proper
roles in society, and the preservation of men's rights.'
Next, Virginia attempted to justify VMI's exclusionary policy by arguing
that VM's adversative method of education provided important benefits to its
122. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
123. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
124. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
125. See id. at 2275.
126. See id. (citing Weinberger v. Wiensenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,643,648 (1975)). The Court
has applied this standard for rejecting classifications based on gender time and again. See
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (finding that prohibiting men
from the nursing program was based on the generalization that nursing was "an exclusively
woman's job"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (finding that the classification
was based on the "archaic and overbroad" generalization that female spouses of military men
would normally be dependent upon their husbands while male spouses of military women
would not).
127. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.
128. See id. at 2276.
129. See id. at 2277.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 2277-78.
132. See id. The Court refers to a common belief of the 1800's where educated men
opposed higher education for women based on the belief that education caused harmful
physiological effects such as interference with the female reproductive organs and extreme
detriments to women's health. See id. at 2277 (citing E. CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION 38-39,
62-63 (1873); H. MAUDSLEY, SEX IN MIND AND IN EDUCATION 17 (1874); C. MEIGS, FEMALES
AND THEIR DISEASES 350 (1848)).
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cadets and that this method would be essentially destroyed if women were
admitted to the program. 33 Examining history, the Court found no persuasive
evidence that VMI's program would be destroyed by admitting women.
134
Therefore, the Court rejected the argument and held that even though certain
aspects of the program would have to change, 135 the adversative method could
be used to train some women. 1
36
The Court concluded that although diversity in education was an
important state interest, the diversity provided by VMI was not the opportunity
to attend a single-sex school, but rather the opportunity to attend a school that
uses the adversative method of learning.137 Moreover, the Court concluded that
admitting women to VMI would not destroy the program. Because Virginia
failed to establish that diversity was its primary goal in excluding women and
that by admitting women the educational program at VMI would be destroyed,
Virginia failed to show an exceedingly persuasive justification for the all-male
policy. Thus, its actions violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
38
The Court then turned to the issue of the proper remedy for Virginia's
constitutional violation. 139 Relying on Milliken v. Bradley,40 the Court held
that persons who suffer from discrimination must be put in the position they
would have attained if discrimination had not occurred.'4' In addition, the state
133. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2279. The argument that "the introduction of women at VMI
will materially alter the very program in which women seek to partake" is known as the Catch-
22 theory. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 899, 897. See also Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths,
Historical Narratives and Social Science Evidence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia
Military Institute Case. 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 189, 199, 318 (1996).
134. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2280. The Court pointed out previous situations where women
have entered careers that were exclusively male but are now freely open to both sexes, such as
law, medicine, and law enforcement. See id. at 2280-81. In addition, the Court noted the
success of the nation's military academies, West Point, the Naval Academy at Annapolis, and
the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs. See id. & n. 13. These government-supported
institutions became co-ed through the legislative process in 1976. See id.
135. See id. at 2279. The Court agreed that certain aspects of the VMI program would have
to change, such as housing arrangements, privacy policies, and physical training requirements.
See id.
136. See id. at 2272. The Court based this conclusion on expert testimony from both sides
that the adversative method, although not suited for most women, would be effective for some
women. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434 (W.D. Va. 1991) (testimony
of Virginia expert witness Dr. Richard C. Richardson). Because generalizations cannot be used
in making classifications by sex, the issue is whether Virginia could constitutionally deny
women who possess the will and ability to complete the activities of VMI, not whether a
majority of women could complete the program. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(holding that classifications based on gender cannot be based on generalizations).
137. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at2281.
138. See id. at 2282.
139. Seeid.
140. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
141. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2282.
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must show that the remedy is directly related to the violation 42 and that it bars
similar discrimination in the future. 43 Although Virginia implemented the
VWIL program for women, Virginia's remedy failed because VWlL did not
provide the same unique method of education; therefore, women who possess
the will and ability to attend and participate in the adversative method still
suffer discrimination.' The Court rejected the argument that the differences
in methods are pedagogically justified. 41 In addition, the Court emphasized
that the remedy to be created was not to be designed for the majority of women
but for those women who have the desire and ability to participate in the
adversative method. 146 Furthermore, the Court stressed the importance of the
intangible differences in the two programs. 147 Based on precedent established
in Sweatt v. Painter,148 the Court found that the two programs were not
substantially equal and promptly rejected the Fourth Circuit's analysis under
a "substantive comparability" test. 1
49
In a concurring opinion Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority
of the Court that VMI's all-male admission policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause and that VWIL is not a proper remedy for the violation.'50
However, the Chief Justice took issue with the Court's use of the phrase
"exceedingly persuasive justification."' 5' In Chief Justice Rehnquist's view,
"exceedingly persuasive justification" was not a test developed by the Court,
but only a phrase that the Court had previously used to describe the test.'52
Therefore, the Court should have analyzed the exclusionary policy by simply
142. See id. at 2282-83.
143. See id. at 2283 (citing Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
144. See id. at 2284-85. VWIL does not offer the opportunity to participate in strict
military training, to live in barrack housing, or to complete a program of absolute mental stress
and regulation. See id. at 2283. In addition, VWIL also does not provide the math and science
emphasis in its curriculum that VMI offers, its $54 million endowment of VWIL is significantly
less than the $131 million endowment of VMI, and VWIL lacks the network of alumni that
VMI maintains. See id. at 2284-85.
145. See id. at 2283-84. The Court found that these differences were based on
generalizations and stereotypes and therefore failed to support Virginia's argument. See id. at
2284.
146. See id. at 2283-84.
147. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2285.
148. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that an all-black law school established as a remedy for
the exclusion of black students from a state-supported law school was not substantially
comparable because the new school lacked intangible benefits such as reputation, experience
of the faculty, influence of the alumni, and prestige).
149. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2285-86.
150. See id. at 2287 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
151. See id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).




determining whether the exclusion of women from VMI was substantially
related to an important governmental interest. 1
53
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that diversity was not Virginia's
primary objective, in his view the Court erred in relying on history.'54
According to the Chief Justice, until the Court's decision in Hogan, VMI had
no notice that its all-male admission policy might offend the Constitution. 55
Prior to that decision the denial of admission based on gender was not
necessarily unconstitutional. 5 6 Therefore, only VMIv's policy after Hogan
should be scrutinized.'57 By applying this post-Hogan analysis, Justice
Rehnquist concluded that diversity was not Virginia's objective in maintaining
an all-male public institution of higher learning. 58
Chief Justice Rehnquist also found that even if diversity was an actual
objective, Virginia would still have violated the Constitution because the state
offered no opportunity for diverse education to women.' 59 Had Virginia made
an effort to provide women with a comparable opportunity after Hogan, the
effort would have supported Virginia's argument that diversity in education
was an important state interest. 160 However, Virginia did nothing to provide
women a comparable opportunity in education, which sustained the finding
that diversity was not an objective.' 6
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist disputed the majority's analysis by
concluding that admitting women to VMI may not have been the sole
remedy. 162 According to the Chief Justice, the majority framed the equal
protection violation as the exclusion of women from VMI and this mistakenly
implied that the only remedy was to require VMI to open its doors to
women. 163 Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that the constitutional violation
was not the exclusion of women from VMI, but the denial of a comparable
opportunity for women.' 64 Furthermore, a proper remedy does not require
153. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
154. See id. at 2289 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
155. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2289 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
156. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
157. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
158. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed to the report
produced by the Mission Study Committee that was created to review VMI's admittance policy
in light of Hogan. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The report did not cite diversity in
education as a reason for maintaining the all-male policy, but credited the changes that would
be made to the program as the reason why the women should not be admitted. See id.
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
159. See id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
160. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
161. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
162. See id. at 2291 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
163. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
164. See id. at 2291 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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every aspect of the schools to be identical, but rather an identical quality of
education.165 Because Chief Justice Rehnquist found that VWIL was innately
inferior, he concluded that women were still denied a comparable educational
opportunity to that which the state provides for men through VMI
66
Justice Scalia vigorously dissented. 167 In his view there is no basis for
striking down a practice that is deeply rooted in tradition and does not
expressly violate the text of the Constitution. 16 In Justice Scalia's opinion
VMI's exclusion of women is a practice of long, unbroken tradition that did not
violate the Constitution when implemented and thus, should not be found to
violate the Constitution today. 169
As a basis for his dissent, Justice Scalia rejected any consideration of an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" and looked only at whether the gender-
based classification was substantially related to an important governmental
interest. 70 According to Justice Scalia, the majority incorrectly used the strict
scrutiny standard by focusing on the fact that some women could successfully
complete the VMI program.17' By applying the basic intermediate test, he
found that Virginia had an absolute interest in providing effective college
education to its citizens.172 He concluded that not only did the evidence show
that single-sex education is beneficial, but the evidence also indicated that the
adversative method is a unique and beneficial method of education.
173
Therefore, the all-male VMI program was substantially related to the goal of
providing well-rounded educational opportunities. 174
Although the majority found that Virginia's asserted interest in diversity
was pre-textual, 175 Justice Scalia relied on the 1990 Report of the Virginia
Commission on the University of the 21st Century to the Governor and General
Assembly that stated that "diversity and autonomy" were the basis of Virginia's
education system. 176 Therefore, diversity was Virginia's true and legitimate
purpose in maintaining VMfl as an all-male institution. 1
77
165. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
166. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
167. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497
U.S. 62, 95 (1990)).
169. See id. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 2294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. See id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2297 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 2297 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 2299 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Finally, Justice Scalia stated that VWIL as a remedy is not an issue under
his analysis.' t As long as the all-male policy is substantially related to the
important government interest, in this case education, no violation has occurred
and no remedy is required.' 79 Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that Virginia
and the program at VMI are not in violation of the Constitution.8 °
According to Justice Scalia, the implications of the majority opinion are
drastic.' First, Justice Scalia asserted that by increasing the standard of
review the Court has made the intermediate standard indistinguishable from
strict scrutiny." 2 In addition, the majority rendered single-sex public education
unconstitutional and, in his words, "functionally dead."'183 Not only are public
single-sex institutions extinct, but private single-sex institutions are in great
danger.' Because private institutions are also dependent on government
funds, an issue arises as to whether the government would violate the
Constitution by providing state support to single-gender institutions.'85
V. SIGNIFICANCE
By forcing Virginia Military Institute to open its doors to women, the
Court raises tremendous questions about both the application of a heightened
standard of scrutiny and the constitutionality of public and private single-sex
schools. First, the Court moves the standard closer to strict scrutiny.'8 6 After
VMI, state governments and legislatures must satisfy a standard somewhere
between intermediate and strict scrutiny when using gender-based classifica-
tions.187 However, if VMI is viewed only as defining the intermediate standard
more precisely, this new heightened level may not be an extreme shift from
past precedent, and may not produce different results from those that would
have followed under the old standard.1
8
178. See id. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 2299 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. See id. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. See id. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2306-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), where the Court struck down a state program to buy books
for schools that discriminate on basis of race, holding that state government cannot grant this
type of aid if that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate and reinforce private discrimination.
See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2306-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term, Forward: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 73 (Nov. 1996).
187. See Sunstein, supra note 186, at 73.
188. See Sunstein, supra note 186, at 73.
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In addition, the Court had never before found a state's alleged interest to
be only a rationalization for gender-based classifications when, in actuality, the
discriminatory classification promoted the interest.'89 For example, in Hogan,
the Court deemed the gender-based classification a rationalization only after
determining that the classification did not readily advance the asserted interest.
By finding Virginia's interest in maintaining a gender-based classification to
be a rationalization even though the Court found that the classification
promoted the interest, the Court treads on new ground. 190
Finally, and possibly most significantly, VMI has future implications for
public and private single-sex schools. Although VMI can be distinguished on
the basis that the school provided a very unique method of education not
available to women anywhere, the line the Court drew is unclear, and single-
sex education may very well be in danger. However, although VMI may imply
that single-sex public schools are per se unconstitutional, the Court has not
required lower courts to invalidate both public and private single-sex
educational programs. 9' Single-sex education is an effective and beneficial
method of education providing opportunities for individual growth and
experiences that are not found in co-ed institutions. 92 Therefore, if the
government is obligated to provide the best and most effective education to its
citizens, a state would have an important interest in funding single-sex colleges
and universities.193 On the other hand, when taxpayer dollars are spent to
support an institution of higher education, a question arises as to whether the
government can expressly deny women the right to participate. VMI is a
middle ground in this dilemma. First, VMI denies states the right to provide an
extremely unique opportunity to men while denying the same opportunity to
women. But, second, the Court in VMI based its decision on its finding that
Virginia's rationalization was pre-textual and the state's purpose was not to
promote diversity but to deny women admittance to VMI.'94 Therefore, the
Court does not prohibit a state from providing single-sex education but only
from denying one gender the opportunity to participate in a unique method of
education.
Although many questions remain concerning the status of gender and
education, VMI is an extremely significant decision that will continue to be
debated in the future. What is certain is that the Court has firmly set yet
189. See Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REv. 135, 181 (Nov. 1996).
190. See Leading Cases, supra note 189, at 181.
191. See Sunstein, supra note 186, at 76.
192. See VM1, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-77.
193. See Jon A. Soderberg, The "Constitutional" Assault on the Virginia Military Institute,
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 429,440 (1996).
194. See Sunstein, supra note 186, at 76.
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another stepping stone along the road to equal treatment between men and
women.
Heather Larkin Eason

